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Abstract 
 After witnessing an event, people often report having seen details that were merely 
suggested to them. Evidence is mixed regarding how well participants can use confidence 
judgments to discriminate between their correct and misled memory reports. We tested the 
prediction that the confidence-accuracy relationship for misled details depends upon the 
availability of source cues at retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 77) viewed a 
videotaped staged crime before reading a misleading narrative. After seven minutes or one 
week, the participants completed a cued recall test for the details of the original event. Prior 
to completing the test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained misleading 
details to encourage source monitoring. The results showed that the strength of the 
confidence-accuracy relationship declined significantly over the delay. We interpret our 
results in the source monitoring framework. After an extended delay, fewer diagnostic source 
details were available to participants, increasing reliance on retrieval fluency as a basis for 
memory and metamemory decisions. We tested this interpretation in a second experiment, in 
which participants (N = 42) completed a source monitoring test instead of a cued recall test. 
We observed a large effect of retention interval on source monitoring, and no significant 
effect on item memory. This research emphasizes the importance of securing eyewitness 
statements as soon as possible after an event, when witnesses are most able to discriminate 
between information that was personally seen and information obtained from secondary 
sources. 
 
Keywords: Misinformation effect, confidence, resolution, metacognition, source monitoring. 
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Confidence-Accuracy Resolution in the Misinformation Paradigm is Influenced by the 
Availability of Source Cues 
1. Introduction 
 In a seminal study, Loftus et al. (1978) showed that people often incorporate 
misleading information encountered after a witnessed event into their memory reports of that 
event. Dozens of studies have replicated this misinformation effect, repeatedly showing that 
participants often report having seen details that were merely suggested (e.g., Belli et al., 
1994; Chambers and Zaragoza, 2001; Lindsay, 1990). The metacognitive experiences 
associated with these errant memory reports have recently come under the empirical 
spotlight. A key question is whether participants are able to discriminate between their real 
and errant memory reports after exposure to misinformation. To date, evidence is mixed, with 
some researchers reporting very poor discrimination (Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; 
Cann and Katz, 2005; Tomes and Katz, 2000), and others reporting reasonably high 
discrimination (Higham et al., 2011). In this paper, we focus on the availability of source 
cues as a moderator of metacognitive discrimination in the misinformation paradigm. We 
argue that when source cues are relatively accessible, participants are better able to 
discriminate between their correct and suggested memories, but when source cues are 
relatively inaccessible, discrimination worsens. 
1.1 Source monitoring and misinformation 
The basic misinformation paradigm includes three stages. First, participants witness 
an event. The event is often depicted in slides (e.g., Frost et al., 2002; Higham et al., 2011; 
McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1989) or by video (e.g., Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; 
Cann and Katz, 2005), though live events have also been used, including those in which the 
participant was actively involved (e.g., Eisen et al., 2013; Holmes and Weaver, 2010; Sondhi 
and Gupta, 2007). Second, the participant is exposed to misinformation, which may be 
CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY RESOLUTION AND MISINFORMATION 4 
 
embedded in a narrative (e.g., Belli et al., 1992; Lindsay, 1990), incorporated into a series of 
post-event questions (e.g., Chambers and Zaragoza, 2001; Hekkanen and McEvoy, 2002), or 
presented by another witness (e.g., Meade and Roediger, 2002; Wright et al., 2000). Finally, 
the participant’s memory is tested. Test formats have varied between studies, and have 
included recognition (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978; McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985), cued recall 
(e.g., Belli et al., 1994; Thomas et al., 2010), free recall (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2006), and 
source memory tests (e.g., Lindsay and Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza and Koshmider, 1989). A 
consistent finding in these studies is that people often report having seen details that were 
merely suggested to them. 
Although it was initially suggested that the original memory trace was irrevocably 
altered by the misinformation (Loftus et al., 1978; see also Greene et al., 1982; Loftus, 1979), 
there is now considerable evidence that the original memory trace can co-exist, unaltered, 
alongside the memory trace for the suggested detail (e.g., Christiaansen and Ochalek, 1983; 
Lindsay and Johnson, 1989). The upshot of this is that, under the right conditions, the original 
detail can be retrieved and the harmful influence of the misinformation can be undone (e.g., 
Gordon and Shapiro, 2012; Wright, 1993).  
How might a participant resolve the discrepancy of having two conflicting memory 
traces available? According to the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), when 
information is stored in memory, it is stored alongside various cues that can be used to infer 
the source of the information. These cues include perceptual details (e.g., visual and auditory 
details), spatial and temporal information, records of cognitive operations (e.g., elaboration, 
retrieval), and affective information. Consider a misinformation study in which a participant 
sees a hammer but later reads that the tool was a wrench. The memory for the hammer may 
be accompanied by perceptual details concerning its colour, shape, size, location within the 
scene, and so on. The memory for the wrench, however, may include perceptual details about 
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the typeface in which the word was written, and the sound of the word as it was read. In a 
memory test, a participant could use these cues to discount the wrench and to correctly 
respond that the item was a hammer.  
From the source monitoring perspective, performing accurately on a memory test 
following exposure to misinformation depends upon two factors. First, the participant must 
actively engage in source monitoring at retrieval. Second, diagnostic source cues (i.e., those 
that reliably differentiate between the event and post-event sources) must be available and 
accessible. Neither of these conditions, alone, will be sufficient for accurate performance. If a 
participant has ready access to diagnostic cues yet does not attempt to retrieve them, instead 
relying on retrieval fluency, then the participant will likely report some misinformation. 
Conversely, if a participant attempts to source monitor, but there are no (or very few) 
diagnostic cues available, source monitoring will be unsuccessful, potentially leading to 
reporting of misinformation. Below we present evidence that 1) participants do not 
automatically engage in source monitoring in misinformation tasks; and 2) even if 
participants are attempting to source monitor, the availability of source cues determines the 
likelihood of misinformation being reported.   
First, there is considerable evidence that participants do not automatically engage in 
source monitoring. For example, test formats that encourage source monitoring typically 
produce smaller misinformation effects than testing conditions that promote responding based 
on retrieval fluency. Lindsay and Johnson (1989) showed participants a scene of a cluttered 
office before presenting them with a narrative containing several incorrect details. The 
participants were then presented with a list of items including event details and suggested 
details. Half of the participants made yes/no recognition decisions about whether each item 
had appeared in the picture, while the remaining participants made source judgments for each 
item. The proportion of items incorrectly attributed to the scene was .66 for the recognition 
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test participants and only .32 for the source test participants (which was not significantly 
different from the control participants’ error rate of .30). The authors argued that the 
recognition test participants had responded based on retrieval fluency, and had not engaged in 
source monitoring. The source test participants, however, could not rely on retrieval fluency, 
and so had to actively engage in source monitoring. 
Further evidence that participants do not automatically engage in source monitoring 
comes from studies that have warned participants prior to the test that the post-event 
information contained incorrect information (these are often called postwarnings, as they are 
presented subsequent to the misinformation). Several studies have found that postwarnings 
reduce the size of the misinformation effect, at least under some conditions (e.g., Chambers 
and Zaragoza, 2001; Christiaansen and Ochalek, 1983; Echterhoff et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 
2010). Because postwarnings are, by definition, presented after the misinformation has been 
encoded, their effectiveness cannot be due to differential encoding of the misleading details. 
Rather, the effects must be due to differences in retrieval processes. Specifically, it has been 
argued that warnings alert participants to the need to monitor the sources of their 
recollections. Given a postwarning, a participant who retrieves the suggested detail and who 
also recovers source cues that link the item to the post-event information may continue to 
search their memory for an alternative response. Without a postwarning, the participant may 
accept the suggested detail on the basis of its familiarity, thus terminating their memory 
search before the original detail is retrieved.  
Even if a participant attempts to monitor the source of their memories, source 
misattribution errors will still occur. These errors should be relatively infrequent when 
diagnostic source cues are readily available, but common when source cues are unavailable. 
One factor that should have a large impact upon the availability of source cues is retention 
interval. Several studies have reported that the magnitude of the misinformation effect 
CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY RESOLUTION AND MISINFORMATION 7 
 
increases with longer retention intervals (e.g., Frost, 2000; Frost et al., 2002; Holmes and 
Weaver, 2010; Underwood and Pezdek, 1998). Frost et al. (2002), for example, showed 
participants a slide sequence in a first session, which was followed by a narrative containing 
some misleading details. Half of the participants completed a memory test 10 minutes later, 
while the remaining participants completed the memory test in a second session one week 
later. Participants in the one week delay condition were around 30-40% more likely to report 
misinformation than participants in the 10 minute delay condition. The authors concluded 
that there were fewer source cues available to participants after a longer delay, increasing the 
source similarity between the original and suggested details in memory. 
In summary, source monitoring appears to play a central role in the production of 
misinformation errors. Participants will make fewer misinformation errors if they are 
encouraged to engage in source monitoring, but only if there are diagnostic source cues 
available at test. 
1.2. Metacognitive monitoring and misinformation 
 Although the mechanisms that underlie the misinformation effect are still under 
debate, it is clear that participants often report misinformation. An important question, both 
theoretically and practically, is to what extent participants are able to discriminate between 
their correct and incorrect memories. A useful statistic for answering this question is 
resolution. Assessing resolution requires that participants respond to a reasonable number of 
items, assigning a confidence rating to each response. High resolution would be demonstrated 
if participants consistently assigned higher confidence ratings to their correct responses than 
to their incorrect responses; lower resolution would be demonstrated if there was 
considerable overlap in the confidence ratings for correct and incorrect responses.  
 A handful of studies have examined resolution after exposure to misinformation. 
Three studies have found reasonably strong resolution for control items but very poor 
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resolution for misled items (Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; 
Tomes and Katz, 2000). In fact, in each of these studies, resolution for misled items was not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that the participants were unable to discriminate 
between their correct and misled responses. Tomes and Katz (2000) concluded that after the 
presentation of misinformation, “confidence becomes useless as an indicator of veracity” (p. 
279). However, this conclusion may have been premature. In two experiments, Higham et al. 
(2011) reported similarly high resolution for misled items as for control items.  
 What could account for the discrepancy between the results of Higham et al. (2011) 
and those of prior studies? Higham et al. designed their procedure to encourage source 
monitoring by providing an explicit postwarning about the narrative. Participants were told 
that half of the questions on the test concerned details that had been incorrectly described in 
the post-event narrative, while the remaining questions concerned details that had not been 
described in the narrative. None of the other studies included a postwarning. In fact, in none 
were the participants even instructed to respond on the basis of what they remembered seeing 
rather than what they remembered reading. Higham et al. argued that participants in these 
studies would have had no reason to engage in source monitoring. They may well have 
assumed that the post-event information was a veridical source of information, and that any 
item that appeared familiar must therefore have been part of the original event (even if they 
could not explicitly recall seeing that item). Thus, engagement in source monitoring may be 
necessary for accurate discrimination between correct and misled responses. 
Higham et al.’s (2011) results suggest that confidence judgments may be based on the 
same information as the memory decision itself. Without a postwarning (as in Bonham and 
González-Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; Tomes and Katz, 2000), participants base 
their memory decisions and their confidence judgments on retrieval fluency, which can be 
misleading when misinformation has been presented (Lindsay and Johnson, 1989). This 
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produces poor resolution for misled items. With a strong postwarning, participants base both 
their memory decisions and their confidence judgments on the available source cues (as in 
Higham et al.). Thus, when diagnostic source cues are readily available, participants can use 
confidence to discriminate between their correct and suggested memories. 
Earlier we argued that the success of a source monitoring attempt will depend upon 
the availability of source cues at retrieval and that source cues degrade over an extended 
retention interval. If participants base their confidence judgments on the same source cues 
that are used to produce the memory decision, then we might predict that longer retention 
intervals should reduce resolution for misled items. The aim of this study is to provide further 
evidence for the source monitoring hypothesis of confidence judgments, by examining the 
impact of retention interval on resolution. 
1.3. The present study 
 Four studies have examined resolution within the misinformation paradigm (Bonham 
and González-Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; Higham et al., 2011; Tomes and Katz, 
2000). In each of these experiments, the event, the misinformation, and the memory test took 
place within a single session. Thus, the retention intervals were mere minutes. In the present 
study, we showed our participants an event and presented them with a misleading narrative in 
a first session. Half of the participants also completed a memory test in the first session; the 
remaining participants returned one week later to complete the memory test. Before the 
memory test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained inaccurate details. In 
the interests of generalizability, we chose to use a cued recall test in the present study. This 
method contrasts with the yes/no recognition tests (Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; 
Cann and Katz, 2000; Tomes and Katz, 2000) and n-alternative forced choice tests (Higham 
et al., 2011) used previously. Thus, a conceptual replication of earlier findings with an 
alternative testing method would increase our confidence in the reliability of our findings. 
CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY RESOLUTION AND MISINFORMATION 10 
 
Our primary hypothesis was that resolution for misled items would decline 
substantially over the retention interval, and at a higher rate than resolution for control items. 
Consequently, we expected that we would replicate the results of Higham et al. (2011) in the 
short delay condition, with good resolution for control and misled items. In the long delay 
condition, however, we predicted that we would find good resolution for control items but 
poor resolution for misled items, in line with previous studies (Bonham and González-
Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; Tomes and Katz, 2000).  
 In addition to confidence judgments, we also asked participants whether they would 
like to testify or withhold each response (see Higham et al., 2011). Type-2 signal detection 
measures were then calculated to provide a behavioural index of participants’ abilities to 
discriminate between their own correct and incorrect answers (Higham et al., 2009). We 
expected these data to complement the confidence judgments. Specifically, we expected good 
discrimination for misinformed items in the short delay condition but poor discrimination in 
the long delay condition. 
2. Experiment 1  
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants and Design 
 Eighty participants took part for credit on an introductory Psychology course or for 
payment. Two participants were excluded as they were not fluent in English; all remaining 
participants were native English speakers. One participant was excluded for failing to follow 
instructions, leaving 77 participants in the final analyses. Fifty four participants were female, 
22 were male, and one did not provide his or her gender. The mean age was 22.45 years (SD 
= 9.12 years). 
 The experiment followed a 2 (Item Type: control, misled) × 2 (Retention Interval: 
immediate, delayed) mixed design, with repeated measures on the first factor. Thirty seven 
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participants were randomly allocated to the immediate testing condition and 40 were 
randomly allocated to the delayed testing condition. 
2.1.2. Materials 
 The event was a videotaped staged crime, in which a thief, posing as a gas installation 
worker, robs several items from an elderly man’s home. The event was approximately four 
minutes long. 
Pilot testing was undertaken to ensure that 1) memory for each of the critical items 
was reasonable, even after a one week delay; and 2) the misleading suggestions were all seen 
as plausible. In the first pilot test, participants (N = 15) watched the video and then completed 
a cued recall questionnaire immediately and again after one week. Only items that were 
remembered by more than 50% of participants were selected as potential critical items. In the 
second pilot test, a new group of participants (N = 15) watched the video and then completed 
a 42-item questionnaire. Each question referred to a detail from the video, and had four 
possible responses. One response was the correct detail, while the remaining responses were 
incorrect. Participants were asked to choose which alternative had actually been presented in 
the video and were asked to rate the plausibility of each other alternative on a 1 (high 
implausible) to 7 (highly plausible) scale. Items with mean plausibility ratings of 4-5 were 
selected as the misleading details for the study. After pilot testing, 32 items were selected as 
critical details.  
 The post-event information was presented in a 480 word narrative (see Appendix). 
Two versions of the narrative were created, each including 16 incorrect details. All of these 
details contradicted a detail that was seen in the video. For example, the video showed the old 
man sitting in a wooden rocking chair, but the relevant misleading detail was that he was 
sitting in a leather chair. The 16 critical details that served as misleading items for half of the 
participants served as control items for the remaining participants.  
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Most of the control items were not mentioned in the narrative, or were mentioned 
only in a neutral form. For example, one critical item concerned the colour of the thief’s 
jumper (navy blue). In one version of the narrative, participants read that the thief was 
“dressed in a green jumper” (misleading detail); in the other version, the thief is simply 
described as “dressed in a jumper” (control detail). However, to ensure that the narrative 
flowed coherently, four control details were mentioned in their correct, specific form in each 
version of the narrative. For example, one narrative mentioned that the thief offered to 
provide a free quotation on gas installation to gain entry to the victim’s house.  
 The memory test consisted of 32 cued recall questions (16 relating to the 
misinformation items and 16 to the control items), each corresponding to one of the critical 
details. The questions were worded to elicit a fine-grained response: for example, “What kind 
of chair was the old man sitting in?” Next to the space for each answer was a confidence 
scale, showing numbers from 0% to 100% in 10% increments.    
2.1.3. Procedure 
 Participants signed up for a study on “the effect of delayed recall on memory for 
event details”. Participants were tested individually or in groups of two, though they worked 
independently at their own computer terminal throughout the whole experiment. Upon arrival 
at the laboratory, participants watched the staged crime video. They were told to pay close 
attention to the video but they were not explicitly informed that they would have their 
memories tested on any specific aspects of the event. 
 Following the video, participants completed a filler task (a series of mazes) for seven 
minutes. All participants were then presented with one of the two versions of the post-event 
narrative. To ensure that the information was being processed, the narrative was presented on 
six pieces of card, in a scrambled order. Participants were asked to read each card carefully 
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and to sort them into chronological order, and the task was presented under the guise of a 
“comprehension task” (see Higham et al., 2011; Zaragoza and Lane, 1994).  
Following the narrative task, participants completed a second filler task (additional 
mazes) for seven minutes. Participants who had been assigned to the immediate condition 
proceeded to the memory task, whereas participants in the delayed condition were dismissed. 
These participants returned one week later to complete the memory test. Crucially, 
participants did not know which delay condition they had been assigned to until this point in 
the experiment. Thus, there was no possibility that participants differentially encoded the 
information in anticipation of a short or long delay. 
Participants received the following instructions prior to the memory test: “Please 
think back to the film you watched, and for every question write down what you remember 
seeing in the film. Please also rate how confident you are that each response you give is 
correct. It is important that you report only what you remember seeing, because the narrative 
you read contained some incorrect details. If you really cannot remember, please make your 
best guess (i.e., write down the first thing that comes to mind)”.1  
After completing the memory test, participants were asked to look back through their 
responses and to consider whether they would testify to each response. Specifically, 
participants were given the following instructions: “We now want you to imagine that the 
questions you have just been asked in the questionnaire have been asked in a court of law, 
and the responses you give will be considered as your eyewitness testimony. You are the only 
eyewitness of the robbery, therefore your testimony needs to be as accurate as possible, as 
any incorrect responses could have serious consequences for this investigation. With this in 
mind, please go through and write a “T” for testify in the left-hand box for the answers that 
you would be willing to testify in a court of law. For those responses you would not offer as 
evidence in a court of law, write “W” for withhold.” Thus, we used a “two-pass” procedure, 
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in which participants made their testify/withhold decisions on a second lap of the 
questionnaire. The two-pass procedure has been criticized (e.g., Higham and Arnold, 2007) 
as the extra processing time afforded by the second lap may cause participants to change their 
minds (for example, if they recalled additional information between making the response and 
making the testify/withhold judgment). However, as our main concern was with resolution, 
we chose to use the two-pass procedure to avoid any possibility that the testify/withhold 
judgments were contaminating the confidence judgments. 
After all of the tasks were completed, participants were thanked, debriefed, and asked 
not to discuss the experiment with anyone else.  
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Coding 
 Each response was coded as correct, incorrect-guess, or incorrect-misinformation. 
Where responses incorporated some aspect of both the original detail and the misleading 
detail (i.e., a ‘memory blend’; Belli, 1988; Skagerberg and Wright, 2008a), the response was 
coded as incorrect-misinformation. Two blinded independent raters coded the responses. 
Agreement was 97.5%, and disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
2.2.2. Response accuracy 
 Table 1 shows the proportion of correct, incorrect-guess, and incorrect-
misinformation responses to control and misleading details. Note that no misleading details 
were ever reported for control items (i.e., no participant confabulated a detail that was 
presented as a misleading suggestion in the alternative narrative). Separate 2 (Item Type) x 2 
(Retention Interval) mixed ANOVAs were conducted for the correct responses and incorrect-
guesses. For the incorrect-misinformed responses, an independent samples t test compared 
response rates across the immediate and delayed conditions. For all pairwise comparisons, 
Cohen’s d is reported as a measure of effect size, using formulae appropriate for repeated 
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measures contrasts or between groups contrasts as appropriate (see Dunlap et al., 1996). For 
interaction terms, partial eta square (ηp
2
) is reported as a measure of effect size. 
For correct responses, both main effects were significant. Accuracy was higher for 
control items than for misleading items, F(1, 75) = 28.77, p < .001, d = 0.73, and after a short 
delay than after a long delay, F(1, 75) = 31.37, p < .001, d = 1.29. The interaction term was 
not significant, F(1, 75) = 0.01, p = .99, ηp
2
 < .01. 
 For incorrect-guesses, both main effects were significant. Guessing rates were higher 
for control items than for misinformation items, F(1, 75) = 43.46, p < .001, d = 0.93. 
Guessing rates also increased over the delay period, F(1, 75) = 21.28, p < .001, d = 1.07. The 
interaction term was not significant, F(1, 75) = 1.19, p = .28, ηp
2
 = .02.  
Finally, misinformation was no more likely to be reported after a long delay than after 
a short delay, t(75) = 1.26, p = .21, d = 0.29.  
2.2.3. Resolution 
 To allow for direct comparisons with prior research (e.g., Bonham and González-
Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; Higham et al., 2011; Tomes and Katz, 2000), we 
computed Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations (G) for control items and misled items 
separately, which is a measure of association appropriate for variables on ordinal scales 
(Nelson, 1984). Scores can range from -1 (perfect negative discrimination: all inaccurate 
responses assigned higher confidence ratings than all accurate responses) to +1 (perfect 
positive discrimination: all accurate responses assigned higher confidence ratings than all 
inaccurate responses). For control items, G was computed using correct and incorrect-guess 
responses; for misleading items, G was calculated using correct and incorrect-misinformation 
responses (i.e., incorrect-guess responses were not included in the G coefficient for misled 
items). As in Higham et al. (2011), we included both testified and withheld responses in the 
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resolution scores. Two participants from the immediate condition and two from the delayed 
condition were excluded from the analyses as they did not report any misinformation.  
 The mean G coefficients are show in Figure 1. The coefficients were compared in a 2 
(Item Type) x 2 (Retention Interval) mixed ANOVA. Both main effects were significant. 
Resolution was higher for control items (M = .74, SD = .19) than for misinformation items 
(M = .46, SD = .40), F(1, 71) = 37.29, p < .001, d = 0.93. Resolution was also higher in the 
immediate condition (M = .72, SD = .17) than in the delayed condition (M = .50, SD = .23), 
F(1, 71) = 24.64, p < .001, d = 1.16. However, these main effects should be interpreted in the 
light of a significant interaction term, F(1, 71) = 10.05, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .12.  
 Our primary hypothesis was that retention interval would moderate resolution for 
misled items. An independent samples t test confirmed that retention interval had a large 
effect on resolution for misled items, t(71) = 4.61, p <  .001, d = 1.08. Resolution was 
substantially higher in the immediate condition (M = .65, SD = .24) than in the delayed 
condition (M = .27, SD = .43). Retention interval had a smaller effect on resolution for 
control items, t(71) = 1.84, p =  .07, d = 0.43, with marginally higher resolution in the 
immediate condition (M = .79, SD = .22) than in the delayed condition (M = .71, SD = .15). 
 For comparability with prior studies, we also compared the mean resolution scores for 
control items and misled items in each condition. In the delayed condition, the control-
misinformation difference was large, t(37) = 5.78, p <  .001, d = 1.34. The control-
misinformation difference was also significant in the immediate condition, though the effect 
was smaller, t(34) = 2.58, p =  .01, d = 0.59.   
One potential criticism of the above analyses is that the resolution coefficients for 
control and misled items are based on different information (correct vs. incorrect-guesses, and 
correct vs. incorrect-misinformation, respectively).Arguably, the control coefficient measures 
reality monitoring (the extent to which one can distinguish between real and confabulated 
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memories; Johnson and Raye, 1981) while the misled coefficient measures source monitoring 
(the extent to which one can distinguish between two external sources of information). To 
allay these concerns, we recalculated the gamma correlations for the misled items to include 
all erroneous responses. The results were similar to those reported above: resolution was 
higher in the immediate condition (.67, SD = .23) than in the delayed condition (.39, SD = 
.32), t(72) = 4.20, p < .001, d = 0.98. Thus, our conclusions hold even if guesses are included 
in the resolution index for misled items, though the effect size is somewhat reduced. 
Another potential criticism is that some of the control details were included in the 
narrative, while the majority were not. We recalculated the gamma coefficients for the 
control items, including only the items that were not in the narrative. One additional 
participant was excluded from this analysis as she made no errors in the subset of control 
items included. The means changed very little, leading to a very similar pattern of results. 
Specifically, the main effects of item type, F(1, 70) = 27.37, p < .001, d = 0.83, and retention 
interval, F(1, 70) = 20.51, p < .001, d = 1.08, were significant, as was the crucial interaction 
term, F(1, 70) = 7.58, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .10.  
 To ensure that these results were not simply a product of reduced recall accuracy in 
the delayed condition (Perfect and Stollery, 1993), we ran a (multi-level) linear model 
analysis, in which recall accuracy was entered as a covariate. The interaction between item 
type and recall condition remained significant, F(1, 114.55) = 9.77, p = .002, indicating that 
the results cannot be explained by the reduction in recall accuracy in the delayed condition.  
2.2.4. Type-2 Signal Detection 
 Type-2 dʹ (see Higham, 2002) was calculated for control items and misinformed 
items. Unlike the correlation coefficient, dʹ is unbounded. Negative values indicate negative 
discrimination (more incorrect answers testified than correct answers), and positive values 
indicate positive discrimination (more correct answers testified than incorrect answers). For 
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both control and misled items, the hit rate was defined as the proportion of correct responses 
that were testified. For control items, the false alarm rate was defined as the proportion of 
incorrect-guesses that were testified; for misled items, the false alarm rate was defined as the 
proportion of incorrect-misinformation responses that were testified. For example, if a 
participant reported six misled details and chose to testify three of them, their false alarm rate 
would be .50. Again, two participants from the immediate condition and one from the 
delayed condition were excluded from the analyses as they did not report any misinformation. 
 Mean Type-2 dʹ values are shown in Figure 2. It is immediately apparent that the 
pattern of means closely resembles the pattern for the resolution coefficients in Figure 1. A 2 
(Item Type) x 2 (Retention Interval) mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Item 
Type, F(1, 71) = 29.46, p < .001, d = 0.85, and Retention Interval,  F(1, 71) = 7.55, p = .008, 
d = 0.65. Similar to the earlier gamma correlation findings, these main effects need to be 
interpreted in the light of a significant interaction term, F(1, 71) = 9.39, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .12.  
 In support of our primary hypothesis, retention interval had a large impact on 
discriminability of misled items, t(71) = 3.52, p = .001, d = 0.84, with significantly better 
discrimination in the immediate condition (M = 1.00, SD = 0.66) than in the delayed 
condition (M = 0.40, SD = 0.79). In contrast, retention interval did not significantly affect 
discrimination of control items, t(72) = 0.10, p =  .92, d = 0.02.  
We also compared discriminability for control and misled details. In line with Higham 
et al.’s (2011) findings, we found no significant difference in the immediate condition, t(71) 
= 1.76, p =  .09, d = 0.40. However, in the delayed condition, the control-misled difference 
was large, t(71) = 5.79, p <  .001, d = 1.31.   
 Once again, when we controlled for recall accuracy in a multi-level linear model 
analysis, the interaction term remained significant, F(1, 128.30) = 9.30, p = .003. 
2.2.5. Accuracy and Resolution for Testified Responses 
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 Given the option, participants tend to withhold low confidence answers. The result is 
almost always an increase in accuracy, as low confidence answers are often erroneous (Koriat 
and Goldsmith, 1996). Our results showed that participants were able to increase their 
accuracy by choosing which answers to withhold. For control items, proportion correct 
increased from .71 (SD = .12) to .95 (SD = .37), t(76) = 5.66, p < .001, d = 0.88. For misled 
items, proportion correct increased from .61 (SD = .16) to .81 (SD= .20), t(76) = 11.88, p < 
.001, d = 1.11. The proportion of misinformation that was testified (.18, SD = .19) was 
significantly lower than the proportion that was reported in the forced choice task (.24, SD = 
.15), t(76) = 3.27, p = .002, d = 0.34, indicating that participants were successful in 
withholding misinformation at least some of the time.  
An interesting question is whether providing participants with the option to withhold 
responses affects resolution. We recalculated the gamma coefficients to include only testified 
responses. As these coefficients require at least one incorrect testified response, we could 
only calculate them for a subset of participants. The G for testified misled items included 49 
participants and the G for testified control items included 32 participants. We compared 
resolution for the total set of items with resolution for testified items in two paired-samples t 
tests. Resolution was not affected by withholding responses for either the control items (all 
responses: M = .70, SD = .19; testified responses: M = .65, SD = .48), t(31) = 0.71, p = .48, d 
= 0.15, or the misled items (all responses: M = .38, SD = .36; testified responses: M = .23, SD 
= .63), t(48) = 1.70, p = .10, d = 0.30. We note, however, that the gamma coefficients for the 
testified responses showed much greater variability than the corresponding coefficients for 
the full response set.  
2.3. Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 supported our main hypothesis that resolution for 
misleading details would significantly decline over a delay. In the immediate condition, the 
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confidence-accuracy relationship for misleading details was reasonably strong (as in Higham 
et al., 2011), though less strong than for control details. After one week, however, the 
confidence-accuracy relationship was much weaker – though significantly greater than the 
zero relationship reported in some prior studies (Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; Cann 
and Katz, 2005; Tomes and Katz, 2000).  We believe that the most parsimonious explanation 
for these results is that source cues degrade rapidly over time, reducing the accessibility of 
diagnostic source cues in the delayed condition. In the absence of available source cues, 
participants would have been forced to rely on familiarity, which is an invalid accuracy cue 
after exposure to misinformation.  
However, it is possible that other processes, such as item memory, were affected by 
the delay. If item memory were to decay at different rates for control and misleading details, 
the relative accessibility of the details at test might have downstream effects on confidence 
and, therefore, resolution. In Experiment 2 we directly tested our assumptions that retention 
interval affected source memory to a greater extent than item memory, and that any change in 
item memory over time was similar for control and misleading details. The method was 
identical to Experiment 1 except that the cued recall test was replaced by a source monitoring 
test (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).  
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants and Design 
 A new sample of 42 undergraduate participants took part for credit on an introductory 
psychology course. Participants were randomly allocated to the immediate (n = 20) or 
delayed (n = 22) condition. The mean age was 23.11 years (SD = 7.60 years); 26 (62%) of the 
participants were female. 
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 The experiment followed a 2 (Item Type: control, misled) × 2 (Retention Interval: 
immediate, delayed) mixed design, with repeated measures on the first factor. 
3.1.2. Materials 
 The video, narratives, and filler tasks were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
The source memory test included 32 items, each corresponding to one of the critical details 
from Experiment 1. For each item, the participant was presented with a statement (e.g., “The 
old man was sitting in a wooden rocking chair”), and four response options: “FILM only”, 
“TEXT only”, “BOTH”, or “NEITHER” (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). A space was also 
provided for participants to circle their confidence from 0% to 100% in 10% increments. Two 
versions of the test were created, one for each narrative version. Participants were questioned 
about misleading details and the control details that corresponded to the narrative that they 
had read; they were not questioned about misleading details from the other narrative. So, for 
example, Test A items included the 16 critical misleading details from narrative A, the 12 
critical control details mentioned only in neutral or superordinate form in narrative A, and the 
4 consistent details mentioned in narrative A. The consistent details were excluded from the 
analyses, as the correct source attribution for these items would be “both”.  
3.1.3. Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 2, with the exception of the change in test 
format. Before completing the source memory test, participants were warned “It is important 
that you say that an item appeared in the film only if you remember seeing it, because the 
narrative contained some incorrect details”. They were told to indicate, for each statement, 
whether the detail was a) present only in the film; b) present only in the text; c) present in 
both the film and the text; or d) present in neither the film nor the text. They were also told to 
indicate their confidence in each decision by circling one of the 11 available confidence 
ratings
2
. 
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3.2. Results 
 Table 2 shows the proportion of video, text, both, and neither responses by item type 
and delay. For each of these four response types, independent samples t tests were run to 
compare the mean proportions of responses in the immediate and delayed conditions, 
separately for control and misleading items. To control family-wise error, we used a 
Bonferroni-corrected α of .006 (.05/8). Only one comparison was significant: The proportion 
of misleading items correctly attributed to the text was significantly higher in the immediate 
condition than in the delayed condition, t(38) = 4.10, p < .001, d = 1.33. 
 To estimate item memory, we summed video, text, and both responses. The item 
memory parameters are shown in Table 2. We analyzed item memory in a 2 (Item Type) × 2 
(Delay) mixed ANOVA. The main effect of item type was significant, F(1, 39) = 13.52, p = 
.001, d = 0.73, indicating that item memory was higher for control details  (M = .77, SD = 
.15) than for misleading details (M = .66, SD = .15). However, neither the main effect of 
delay, F(1, 39) = 0.09, p = .76, d = 0.10, nor the Item type × Delay interaction, F(1, 39) = 
1.57, p = .22, ηp
2
 = .04, were significant. Thus, we observed no significant decline in item 
memory over the one week retention interval. 
 To estimate source memory, we calculated the proportion of recognized items that 
were attributed to the correct source (e.g., for control items: Film responses/(Film responses 
+ Text responses + Both responses)). The source memory parameters are shown in Table 2. 
We analyzed source memory in a 2 (Item Type) × 2 (Delay) mixed ANOVA. The main effect 
of item type was significant, F(1, 39) = 21.34, p < .001, d = 0.90, indicating that source 
memory was higher for control details (M = .59, SD = .25) than for misleading details (M = 
.37, SD = .24). Importantly, the main effect of delay was also significant, F(1, 39) = 15.43, p 
< .001, d = 1.26, as source memory was higher in the immediate condition (M = .58, SD = 
.18) than in the delayed condition (M = .38, SD = .14). The Item type × Delay interaction was 
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not significant, F(1, 39) = 1.35, p = .25, ηp
2
 = .03. Thus, in contrast to item memory, source 
memory significantly declined over the retention interval, and similarly for control and 
misleading items. 
3.3. Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the assumptions underlying our 
interpretation of the results from Experiment 1 were sound. Specifically, source memory 
declined significantly over the retention interval, and the effect was large. Given that an item 
was remembered, there was a 58% chance that it would be attributed to the correct source in 
the immediate condition, but that probability dropped to 38% after a one-week delay. In 
contrast, we observed no significant decline in item memory over the delay. In conclusion, 
and in line with prior research (e.g., Frost, 2000; Frost et al., 2002; Holmes and Weaver, 
2010; Underwood and Pezdek, 1998), source memory appears to degrade more rapidly than 
item memory.   
4. General Discussion 
 We tested the prediction that, when participants are encouraged to engage in source 
monitoring, the confidence-accuracy relationship for misled details would be moderated by 
the availability of source cues at retrieval. As a manipulation of source cue availability, we 
varied retention interval, testing participants’ memories either seven minutes or one week 
after exposure to the misinformation. Experiment 2 confirmed the validity of this 
manipulation, as it showed that retention interval had a large effect on source monitoring, but 
no significant effect on item memory. In Experiment 1, our primary hypothesis was 
supported; retention interval had a large impact on two measures of metacognitive 
discrimination for misled details: resolution and Type-2 dʹ (Higham, 2002). In addition, we 
hypothesized that, when source cues were readily available, resolution would be high for 
control items and misled items (as in Higham et al., 2011). In contrast, when source cues 
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were relatively inaccessible, we expected to find a large difference in resolution for the 
control and misled items (as in Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; Cann and Katz, 2005; 
Tomes and Katz, 2000). These predictions were also supported.  
 We argue that the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) provides the 
simplest explanation of our findings. Figure 3 illustrates the decision pathways that might be 
involved in a cued recall task in which the participant is actively engaged in source 
monitoring. First, the participant generates candidate answer(s) in response to a specific 
question. If multiple candidates are generated, the participant selects the best candidate for 
closer scrutiny. The participant then attempts to retrieve cues that will help to diagnose the 
source of the remembered detail. If event-related cues are retrieved (e.g., visuo-spatial 
details), then the participant reports the answer with high confidence. If post-event cues are 
retrieved (e.g., a memory of the typeface in which the word was written), the participant faces 
a decision about whether to report the item or return to their candidate answers to evaluate the 
next-best candidate. Should the participant decide to report the answer, he should assign low 
confidence to the reported detail (as he is aware that it came from the post-event source). 
Finally, if no source cues can be retrieved, the participant may return to his candidate answers 
or he may proceed to an assessment of retrieval fluency. If the retrieval fluency is below 
some pre-determined decision threshold, the participant may return to his candidate answers 
rather than report that answer. However, if the retrieval fluency exceeds the threshold, the 
participant will likely report the item, despite a lack of source cues. The confidence rating 
assigned to the memory report will be scaled to the retrieval fluency (Norman and 
Wickelgren, 1969), which may be misleading in the context of a misinformation experiment 
(Lindsay and Johnson, 1989).  
According to this model, there are two reasons why a participant might report a 
suggested detail with high confidence: if event-related cues are incorrectly retrieved in 
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association with the suggested detail (a source misattribution error); or if the detail was 
lacking in source cues but was associated with high retrieval fluency (a fluency error). Both 
error types may increase over time as source cues degrade (e.g., Frost, 2000; Frost et al., 
2002; Holmes and Weaver, 2010; Underwood and Pezdek, 1998). If few source cues are 
accessible, participants may rely more heavily upon fluency, increasing fluency errors. 
Participants may also adjust their source monitoring criteria over time, requiring less 
evidence to attribute a recalled detail to the event, thus increasing source misattribution 
errors. Similar criterion shifts have been reported in old/new recognition tasks. Strong 
memories lead participants to set strict decision criteria, while weaker memories encourage 
more lenient criteria (Stretch and Wixted, 1998). Disentangling source misattribution errors 
from fluency errors may well be difficult, as they may often co-occur. To isolate their relative 
contributions, future research could use procedures that strongly discourage reliance upon 
retrieval fluency at test (e.g., Lindsay, 1990; Wright, 1993). 
One potential avenue of research is to investigate resolution under conditions that 
should increase source misattribution errors. To our knowledge, the only study to touch on 
this issue is Higham et al. (2011). In Experiment 1, the authors omitted the control details 
from the narrative. In Experiment 2, however, they included the control details in the 
narrative, reasoning that source monitoring would be more difficult as post-event source cues 
(e.g., memory for the typeface of the word) would not reliably discriminate between control 
and misled items. However, resolution was similar across the two experiments, indicating 
that the change in method had little impact. We also included some control items in the 
narrative, yet our results changed little whether or not these items were included in the 
resolution scores.  Perhaps other manipulations will prove more powerful, such as increasing 
the similarity of the event and post-event sources (e.g., Lindsay, 1990), or encouraging the 
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use of mental imagery during the encoding of the post-event information (see related research 
on imagination inflation: Garry et al., 1996; Heaps and Nash, 1999; Thomas et al., 2003).  
 In Experiment 1, we allowed our participants to withhold any of their forced-choice 
answers in a subsequent free report phase. In line with previous research, participants 
increased their accuracy by screening out low-confidence errors (Koriat and Goldsmith, 
1996). Resolution was not significantly affected by the change from forced to free report. 
However, this null effect should be interpreted cautiously. The resolution estimates for the 
testified responses were unstable due to the low number of errors reported; consequently, the 
error variance was large. Furthermore, Perfect and Weber (2012) showed that the order of 
free- and forced- responding influences patterns of final responses in memory tasks. Thus, a 
between-subjects manipulation seems necessary to resolve the question of whether resolution 
is influenced by free versus forced report conditions. 
 A limitation of this research is that retention interval is likely to influence factors 
other than source memory. Experiment 2 allowed us to rule out one obvious candidate, item 
memory, yet there are other potential candidates, including guessing biases, retrieval fluency, 
and meta-cognitive beliefs. It is possible, therefore, that some combination of these factors 
may have contributed to our results. A potential avenue for future research is to explore the 
influence of more “process-pure” manipulations of source memory, such as a manipulation of 
instructions regarding the presence of misinformation, on resolution. Nonetheless, the most 
parsimonious explanation of the present findings is that the accessibility of source cues 
degraded over the retention interval, which in turn disrupted participants’ abilities to monitor 
the accuracy of their reports. However, we must acknowledge that there may have been 
additional factors contributing to the effect.  
  From a practical perspective, our results underscore the importance of securing 
eyewitness statements as quickly as possible after an event has taken place. Not only will the 
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opportunities for exposure to misinformation be reduced, but participants are able to 
discriminate between seen and suggested details, if encouraged to do so. Furthermore, there is 
some evidence that eliciting detailed free recall statements soon after the event reduces 
forgetting rates and protects witnesses from the harmful effects of misinformation that is later 
encountered (Gabbert et al., 2012). Even in cases with limited police resources and multiple 
witnesses (the sorts of situations in which co-witness transmission of misinformation is likely 
to occur; Skagerberg and Wright, 2008b), tools now exist to allow witnesses to record their 
own detailed statements (the Self-Administered Interview; Gabbert et al., 2009). Taken 
together with the results of Higham et al. (2011), our results suggest that the most effective 
way to minimise the harm of misinformation is to secure detailed witness statements at the 
earliest possible point and to encourage source monitoring at retrieval. 
5. Conclusions 
 The strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship following exposure to 
misinformation depends crucially upon: 1) active engagement in source monitoring; and 2) 
the availability of diagnostic source monitoring cues at retrieval. If source cues are easily 
acessible, and if participants are encouraged to retrieve them, participants are able to use 
confidence judgments and testify/withhold judgments to discriminate between real and 
suggested memories. However, if diagnostic source cues are relatively inaccessible (for 
example, due to an extended delay between encoding and retrieval), participants find it much 
more difficult to discriminate between their real and suggested memories.   
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Footnotes 
1
 We instructed our participants to write down a response for each question for three reasons. 
First, the calculation of Type-2 dʹ requires a response to be given for all test items (Higham, 
2002). Second, all previous studies of resolution following misinformation exposure have 
used forced-report data to calculate the coefficients (Bonham and González-Vallejo, 2009; 
Cann and Katz, 2005; Higham et al., 2011; Tomes and Katz, 2000) thus allowing us to 
compare our results to those of prior studies directly.  Third, the calculation of resolution 
requires at least one error is reported. If we had allowed participants to opt out of responding, 
we would have had insufficient data to calculate valid, reliable coefficients for more than a 
handful of our participants.   
2
Confidence ratings in Experiment 2 were recorded for exploratory purposes only, and are not 
reported here. 
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Table 1 
Mean (and Standard Deviation) proportion correct, incorrect-guess, and incorrect-
misinformation in Experiment 1  
 Immediate  Delayed 
Response type Control Misleading  Control Misleading 
Correct .78 (.10) .67 (.17)  .65 (.11) .55 (.13) 
Incorrect-guess .22 (.10) .11 (.20)  .35 (.11) .20 (.10) 
Incorrect-misinformation --- .22 (.16)  --- .26 (.13) 
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Table 2 
Mean (and Standard Deviation) proportion of video, text, both, and neither responses to 
control and misleading items in Experiment 2 
 Control Items  Misleading items 
Response Immediate Delayed  Immediate Delayed 
Video .48 (.18) .42 (.20)  .13 (.11)  .20 (.13)  
Text .03 (.07) .09 (.08)   .34 (.17) .15 (.12)* 
Both  .23 (.22) .28 (.16)  .21 (.13) .30 (.15)  
Neither .26 (.15) .21 (.16)  .33 (.16) .35 (.15) 
Memory parameter 
IM .74 (.15) .79 (.16)  .67 (.16) .65 (.15) 
SM .67 (.26) .52 (.22)  .50 (.22) .24 (.20) 
 
Note: * Difference between immediate and delayed conditions significant to Bonferroni-
corrected α < .006. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficients in the immediate and delayed 
conditions in Experiment 1 Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for within-subjects 
comparisons. 
Figure 2. Mean Type-2 dʹ in the immediate and delayed conditions in Experiment 1. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals for within-subjects comparisons. 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the process through which source monitoring 
influences item reporting and confidence judgments.                                                        
CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY RESOLUTION AND MISINFORMATION  37 
 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Immediate Recall Delayed Recall
M
e
a
n
 G
a
m
m
a
 C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 C
o
e
ff
iic
e
n
ts
 
Recall Condition 
Control Items
Misled Items
CONFIDENCE-ACCURACY RESOLUTION AND MISINFORMATION 38 
 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 3.  
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Appendix 
Narrative Versions A and B 
Note: Misleading details are shown in bold. Consistent control items are shown in italics. 
Narrative A: 
An old man is sitting in his lounge room in a leather chair, reading a book. Directly 
across from him is a small cabinet, and next to this is a television in the left-hand corner. 
There is a large picture of a green forest scene hanging on the middle wall. The old man 
hears a knock at the door, ignores it, but then hears the doorbell and goes over to the front 
door. The old man has grey hair, and is wearing a jumper and black pants. 
The old man opens the front door to find a young man, who is dressed in a green 
jumper with a light pink shirt underneath. He is Caucasian, and has a goatee. The young 
man first informs the old man that many old people die from inhalation of wood fire smoke 
every winter, and then goes on to offer a free quotation on gas installation. The old man 
seems confused, but then lets him in. 
The young man makes his way over to the red-brick fireplace and sets down his 
toolbox, which has a red handle and latch. He takes a tape-measure out from his tool box, 
and proceeds to inspect the fireplace. He then asks the old man if he has the warranty 
papers for the chimney chase. The old man says he shall have to go and search for it.  While 
the old man is gone, the young man steals war memorabilia from the mantelpiece.  
The old man is in his study, which has green carpet and curtains, searching for the 
papers. Meanwhile, in the lounge room, the young man sees the old man’s watch sitting on 
the table next to the old man’s book. He picks up the watch, looks at it, and then just puts it 
back down on the table. The old man then brings the papers out to the young man, who 
thanks him, and then asks for a drink. The old man says of course, and then goes to the 
kitchen.  
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The young man then searches the cupboard next to the fireplace, and inside are a lot 
of board-games and books. He first takes out a small grey box, and opens it to find a silver 
ring inside. He puts it in his toolbox, and continues to search the cupboard. He then finds a 
silver jewellery box, and from it he takes various kinds of bracelets and puts them in his 
toolbox.  
The old man is in the kitchen, preparing the drinks. The two yellow mugs and plate 
are on a serving tray. Meanwhile, in the lounge room, the young man finds a stash of coins 
in a money tin. When the old man returns to the lounge room, the young man says that he is 
sorry, just realized that he’s late for an appointment and has to go, and then quickly leaves 
the house. 
 
Narrative B: 
 
An old man is sitting in his lounge room, reading a book. Directly across from him is 
a small cabinet, and next to this is a bookcase in the left-hand corner.  There is a large 
picture hanging on the middle wall. The old man hears a knock at the door, and ignores it. He 
then hears the doorbell, and makes his way to the door. The old man has grey hair and is 
wearing a blue jumper with a shirt underneath.   
The old man unlocks the gold safety chain, and opens the front door to find the 
young man, who is dressed in a jumper, denim jeans and work boots. He is Caucasian, and 
has messy brown hair. The young man first informs the old man that 30,000 old people die 
from the cold every winter, and then goes on to offer a free fireplace service. The old man 
seems confused, but then lets him in.  
The young man makes his way over to the red-brick fireplace, and sets down his red 
toolbox, and proceeds to inspect the fireplace. Inside the fireplace is a pile of firewood 
sitting in the cast-iron grate.  He then asks the old man if he has the receipt for the chimney 
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chase. The old man says he shall have to go and search for it. While the old man is gone, the 
young man steals an antique clock and a gold photo frame from the mantelpiece.  
The old man is in his study, searching for the papers. Meanwhile, in the lounge room, 
the young man sees the old man’s watch sitting on the table next to the old man’s brown 
book. He picks it up, and then quickly puts it in his toolbox. Back in the study, the old man 
finds the receipt in a tray of papers on top of the desk.  He takes it out to the young man, 
who thanks him, and then asks for a drink. The old man says of course, and offers him a 
coffee. 
The young man then searches the cupboard next to the fireplace. The cupboard doors 
are cream coloured, and inside are a lot of board-games and books. He first takes out a small 
grey box, and opens it. He puts it in his toolbox, and continues to search the cupboard. He 
then finds a jewellery box, and from it, he takes a handful of gold and silver rings and puts 
them into his toolbox.  
The old man is in the kitchen, preparing the drinks and also plate of assorted cakes. 
Meanwhile, back in the lounge room, the young man finds a stash of money in a brown 
envelope in the cupboard. When the old man returns to the lounge, the young man says that 
he has an emergency call out and has to go, and then quickly leaves the house.  
 
 
 
 
